Demetriades v. Yelp by California Superior Court
• • 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
9 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
10 
11 
12 JAMES DEMETRIADES, Case No.: BC484055 
13 ·Plaintiff, 
14 vs. 
15 YELP, INC. , RULINGS/ORDERS 
16 Defendant. 
17 
18 
19 Defendant's Special Motions to Strike are GRANTED. 
20 Defendant's Demurrers are OFF CALENDAR. 
21 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
2:?. James Demetriades ("Plaintiff") commenced action against 
Yelp, Inc. 
i :j::1 ("Defendant") . Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
25·. (FAC) alleges causes of action for: (1) untrue or misleading 
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1 advertising (Bus. ~ Prof. C. §§17500, et seq.); and (2) unfair 
2 business practices (Bus. & Prof. C. §§17200, et seq.) Plaintiff 
3 
alleges that Defendant falsely represents the efficacy and 
4 
ability of its system for filtering comments and reviews. 
5 
Defendant filed two special motions to strike. After the 
6 
filing of the first motion, Plaintiff filed a FAC. The second 
7 
motion is therefore addressed to the FAC. Defendant argues that 
8 
the complaints should be stricken because they target speech 
9 
10 
concerning matters of public interest and speech protected by 
11 
the First Amendment. Defendant then argues that Plaintiff will 
12 not be able to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the 
13 merits because Plaintiff lacks standing, because the claims are 
14 barred by the Communications Decency Act, and because the 
15 alleged misrepresentations are mere puffery that could not have 
16 deceived a reasonable consumer. 
17 In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant fails to 
18 
comprehend that this lawsuit is concerned with 
19 
misrepresentations Yelp made regarding its filter and not the 
20 
comments that were posted on Yelp concerning Plaintiff's 
21 
restaurants. Plaintiff then argues that the conduct at issue 
2:~Di 
: .,-", does not arise from a protected acti vi ty because the FAC falls 
23 
". 
within the commercial speech exception and the public interest 
25. 
exception. Plaintiff next argues that it can establish a 
probability of prevailing on the merits. Plaintiff states that 
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1 he has standing because he is the sole owner of the LLC that 
2 owns the restaurants and paid for thB advertising. Plaintiff 
3 further argues that the CDA does not apply because the 
4 
statements at issue are not third party statements posted on 
5 
Defendant's website. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the 
6 
statements are not mere puffery but instead are statements of 
7 
fact, and that, even if they are opinions, they are still 
8 
actionable because Defendant held itself out as an expert 
9 
10 
regarding the filtering process. 
11 
In Reply, Defendant argues that the commercial speech 
12 exception does not apply because the statements were not 
13 statements of fact, because Defendant's primary business is not 
14 selling advertising, and becaus~ the misrepresentations did not 
15 relate to the advertising. Defendant next argues that the 
16 public interest exception does not apply because Plaintiff 
17 clearly did not file this lawsuit solely for the public 
18 interest. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff lacks 
19 
standing because the injury was to the LLC, not to him. 
20 
Defendant further argues that the claims will also fail because 
21 
they are protected by the CDA and because the statements are not 
2:2~1 
\ 1.l, actionable. 
23 
'\.,. 
II 
; ,~;';! I I 
25,. 
!'U I I 
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1 II. 
2 DISCUSSION 
3 A. Generally 
4 In a motion to strike under CCP §425.16, the court engages 
5 
in a two-part analysis: (1) the court decides whether defendant 
6 
has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action 
7 
arises from a protected activity~ and (2) if such a showing has 
8 
been made, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate a 
9 
10 
probability of prevailing on the merits of his or her claims. 
11 
Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 
12 Cal.4th 53. The purpose of this statute is to respond to 
13 lawsuits that chill citizens from exercising their political 
14 rights to free speech and activities. 
15 B. Arising From Prong 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A defendant has the initial burdening of showing a cause of 
action arises from a protected activity. CCP §425 .16 (e) 1. 
Martinez v. Metabolife Inter. Ins. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 
1 Section 425.16(e) provides: 
(e) As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue u includes: (1) any written or oral statement 
or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or 
;_1': any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral 
23 statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or 
~ review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 
2~:~·\; proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing 
~ made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 
"n.""; issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right 
i~ of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
r" interest. 
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1 186; Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 
2 Cal.App.4th 294, 304. Specifically, courts decide whether 
3 moving parties have made a prima facie showing that the attacked 
4 
claims arise from a protected activity, including defendants' 
5 
right of petition, or free speech, under a constitution, in 
6 
connection with issues of public interest. Soukup v. Law 
7 
Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 260, 278; Paulus v. 
8 
Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 671; Equilon 
9 
10 
Ent., supra, 29 Cal.4th at 67; Gov. Gray Davis Committee v. 
11 
Amer. Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 458-59; 
12 Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro Before Trial (The 
13 Rutter Group 2006) ~7:244.1; CCP §425.16(e). 
14 In determining whether the burden has been satisfied, "the 
15 court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing 
16 affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense 
17 is based." Brill Media Co., LLC v. TCW Group, Inc. (2005) 132 
18 Cal.App.4th 324, 329. Moving parties can satisfy their burden 
19 by showing (1) statements made before legislative, executive or 
20 judicial proceedings, or made in connection with matters being 
21 
considered in such proceedings, or (2) statements made in a 
2,4::; 
;~' public forum, or other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of 
23 
~'''''' 
the constitutional rights of petition or free speech, in 24~< 
,--,~ connection with issues of public interest. CCP §425.16(e); 
25·". 
i~ Equilon Ent., supra, 29 Cal.4th at 66. The motion must be 
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1 supported by declarations stating facts upon which the liability 
2 or defense is based. CCP §425 .16 (b) . 
3 Defendant met its initial burden in establishing that the 
4 
alleged $tatements and allege~ misrepresentations arise from a 
5 
protected activity. Statements regarding the filtering of 
6 
reviews on a social media site such as yelp. com are matters of 
7 
public interest and are therefore protected. A public interest 
8 
involves more than mere curiosity, a broad and amorphous 
9 
10 
interest, or private information communicated to a large number 
11 
of people, and instead concerns a substantial number of people, 
12 some closeness between the statements and the public interest, 
13 and a focus upon the communications as being the interest and 
14 not upon a private controversy. McGarry v. Univ. Of San Diego 
15 (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 110. "Consumer information ... , .at 
16 least when it affects a large number of persons, also generally 
17 is viewed as information concerning a matter of public 
18 interest." Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898. 
19 The statements were also made in a public forum. Barrett v. 
20 
Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal. 4th 33, 41 n.4 ("Web sites accessible to 
21 
the public ... are 'public forums' for purposes of the anti-
SLAPP statute.") 
23 
'\,~ 
Plaintiff's opposition does not discuss whether the alleged 
25 •. 
: ~;i 
statements qualify as protected speech concerning a matter of 
10 public interest pursuant to CCP §425.16. Instead, Plaintiff 
.. , ;"1' ...... 
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argues that the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute do not 
apply because of the commercial speech exception and public 
interest exception found in CCP §425.17. "The burden of proof 
as to the applicability of the commercial speech exemption, 
therefore, falls on the party seeking the benefit of it-i.e., 
the plaintiff." Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc. v. Gore (2010) 
49 Cal. 4th 12, 26. 
The commercial speech exception in CCP §425.17(c) provides: 
Section 425.16 does not apply to any cause of action 
brought against a person primarily engaged in the 
business of selling or leasing goods or services, 
including, but not limited to, insurance, securities, 
or financial instruments, arising from any statement 
or conduct by that person if both of the following 
conditions exist: 
(1) The statement or conduct consists of 
representations of fact about that person's or a 
business competitor's business operations, goods, or 
services, that is made for the purpose of obtaining 
approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases 
of, or commercial transactions in, the person's goods 
or services, or the statement or conduct was made in 
the course of delivering the person's goods or 
services. 
(2) The intended audience is an actual or potential 
buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the. 
statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or 
potential buyer or customer, or the statement or 
conduct arose out of or within the context of a 
regulatory approval process, proceeding, or 
investigation, except where the statement or conduct 
was made by a telephone corporation in the course of a 
proceeding before the California Public Utilities 
Commission and is the subject of a lawsuit brought by 
a competitor, notwithstanding that the conduct or 
statement concerns an important public issue. 
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"Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c), simply 
does not provide ... that every case arising from statements 
uttered by a commercial enterprise are exempted from the anti-
SLAPP statute's purview. u Mendoza v. ADP Screening and 
Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652. 
As recently stated by the Court of Appeals, the commercial 
special exception requires establishing all of the following 
elements: 
Section 425.17, subdivision (c) exempts a cause of 
action arising from commercial speech from the anti-
SLAPP law when '(1) the cause of action is against a 
person primarily engaged in the business of selling or 
leasing goods or services; (2) the cause of action 
arises from a statement or conduct by that person 
consisting of representations of fact about that 
person's or a business competitor's business 
operations, goods, or services; (3) the statement or 
conduct was made either for the purpose of obtaining 
approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases 
of, or commercial transactions in, the person's goods 
or services or in the course of delivering the 
person's goods or services; and (4) the intended 
audience for the statement or conduct meets the 
definition set forth in section 425.17[, subdivision] 
(c) (2) [i.e., an actual or potential buyer or 
customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement 
to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential 
buyer or customer].' 
Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 270, citing Simpson 
~Z~ Strong-Tie, supra, 49 Cal. 4th at 30. "The commercial speech 
23 exemption, like the public interest exemption, 'is a statutory 
":.,,~ 
2~0 exception to section 425.16' and 'should be narrowly 
,,,,.,.. 
: ,~:';I 
251", construed.'u Simpson Strong-Tie, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 22. 
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1 Plaintiff failed to show that the commercial speech 
2 exception applies. Even if Plaintiff has met its burden to 
3 
establish that Defendant is primarily engaged in the business of 
4 
selling advertising, Plaintiff failed to show that the alleged 
5 
misrepresentations arise from a statement of fact about that 
6 
business's operations, goods, or services. First, the alleged 
7 
misrepresentations concern the filtering process for reviews and 
8 
do not relate to the selling of advertising. Second, Plaintiff 
9 
10 
failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations are 
11 
statements of fact instead of opinions and puffery. A review of 
12 the statements
2 shows that these are typical representations made 
13 by a business about its product and are not actionable 
14 representations of fact. Each statement includes subjective 
15 language ("most trusted", "remarkable filtering process", "most 
16 trustworthy", "most established sources", "less trustworthy", 
17 
"rest assured", "most unbiased and accurate information you will 
18 be able to find") "always working to do as good a job as 
19 
possible") . These statements cannot be considered statements of 
20 
fact sufficient to invoke the commercial speech exception 
21 
because they are simply not misrepresentations of fact. 
23 
2~ 
;~0 2 The five alleged misrepresentations are discussed in the Opposition at 6:12 
2~ 
- 7:14. 
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Plaintiff also argues that the publid iBterest exception of 
CCP §425.17(b) applies. That section states: 
Section 425.16 does not apply to any action brought solely in 
the public interest or on behalf of the general public if all of 
the following conditions exist: 
(1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater 
than or different from the relief sought for the 
general public or a class of which the plaintiff is a 
member. A claim for attorney's fees, costs, or 
penalties does not constitute greater or different 
relief for purposes of this subdivision. 
(2) The action, if successful, would enforce an 
important right affecting the public interest, and 
would confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary 
or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large 
class of persons. 
(3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a 
disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in 
relation to the plaintiff's stake in the matter. 
"Section 425.17(b) 's exception applies only to actions brought 
'solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general 
public. ' Use of the term 'solely' expressly conveys the 
Legislative intent that section 425.17(b) not apply to an action 
that seeks a more narrow advantage for a particular plaintiff. 
Such an action would not be brought 'solely' in the public's 
22S interest. The statutory language of 425.17(b) is unambiguous 
23 and bars a litigant seeking 'any' personal relief from relying 
''''. 
24~ on the section 425.17(b) exception." Club Members For An Honest 
25, Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal. 4th 309, 316-17. "Suits 
;'~ I 
: ?"!!' 
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1 motivated by personal gain are not exempted from the anti-SLAPP 
2 motion." Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 
3 916. 
4 Plaintiff failed to show that the public interest exception 
5 
applies because this action is not brought solely in the public 
6 
interest. Plaintiff's own opposition establishes his intense 
7 
personal interest in this case because Plaintiff's claims were 
8 
spurred in part by negative reviews posted by an anonymous user 
9 
10 
and the filtering of allegedly proper reviews. Plaintiff 
11 
repeatedly states that he has a significant financial interest 
12 in these same restaurants whose reviews have been negatively 
13 affected by Yelp's filter. Indeed, Plaintiff seeks an 
14 injunction enjoining defendants from "filtering reviews of Users 
15 of the Yelp website while falsely advertising to the public that 
16 the unfiltered reviews posted on the Yelp website are fair, 
17 trustworthy or unbiased." FAC prayer, '!I2b. This prayer shows 
18 that Plaintiff's claims are not based solely on the public 
19 interest because Plaintiff himself has shown that he has an 
20 
intensely personal and finanGial interest in the review 
21 
filtering process and its resultant reviews for his own 
2~Z! 
I~ restaurants. Therefore, the public interest exception does not 
23 
apply. 
24~<! 
,--
'd As such; for the above reasons, Defendant met its initial 
25,..>, 
i~ burden in establishing that the protection of CCP §425.16 apply . 
-11-. ' : ,~.I,,: 
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1 C. Probability of Success on the Merits 
2 If moving parties successfully have shifted the burden, 
3 then opposing parties must demonstrate a probability of 
4 
prevailing on the merits of the complaint. Equilon Ent., supra, 
5 
29 Cal. 4th at 67; Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 
6 
548; §425.16(b) (1). To establish such a probability, a 
7 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally 
8 
sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts, 
9 
10 
which, if credited by the trier of fact, is sufficient to 
11 
sustain a favorable judgment. Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified 
12 School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1435; Navellier v. 
13 Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88; Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 
14 Cal.App.4th 13, 31 (complaint must not be vulnerable to a 
15 successful demurrer). Hence, the evaluation includes reviews of 
16 the pleadings and moving and opposing declarations. Equilon 
17 Ent., supra, 29 Cal. 4th at 67; CCP §425.16 (b) (2) . "The prima 
18 facie showing of merit must be made with evidence that is 
19 
admissible at trial." Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 
20 
1275, 1289. 
21 
"[AJn action may not be dismissed under this statute if the 
201 
i~ plaintiff has presented admissible evidence that, if believed by 
2}. 
'. 
the trier of fact, would support a cause of action against the 
·8 defendant." Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 683, 729. "The 
25.. 
i0 plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has 'minimal 
. :~.) 
-12-
• • 
1 merit' ... to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. II Soukup v. Law 
2 Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 260, 291. Further, a 
3 plaintiff need not address all alleged theories in order to show 
4 that a cause of action has some merit. A.F. Brown Electrical 
5 
Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec. Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 
6 
Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124. The opposing parties' burden as to an 
7 
anti-SLAPP motion is like that of a party opposing a motion for 
8 
summary judgment. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Lew 
9 
Williams, Inc. (2006) 142 Ca1.App.4th 344,352. Additionally, 
10 
11 
whether complainants have satisfied their burden is a question 
12 of law. Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 
13 811, 821. 
14 Plaintiff failed to show that he has a probability of 
15 prevailing on the merits because Plaintiff has failed to show 
16 that he has standing and because the alleged misrepresentations 
17 that form the basis for his claims under the unfair business 
18 practices and unfair advertising statutes are opinions and 
19 puffery. The elements of a cause of action for false 
20 
advertising are: (1) defendant intended to dispose of real or 
21 
personal property or perform services; and (a) defendant 
22Z, 
10 publicly disseminated advertising containing an untrue or 
23 
r,'tI" 
misleading statement; (b) defendant knew, or should have known, 
24h\ 
,"''''. I~ it was untrue or misleading; and (c) it concerned the real or 
25·". 
!1~ personal property or services or their disposition or 
-13-
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1 performance; or defendant publicly disseminated advertising with 
2 the intent not to sell the property or services at the price 
3 stated or as advertised. Bus. & Prof. C. §17500; William L. 
4 Stern, Bus. & Prof. C. §17200 Practice (The Rutter Group 2006) 
5 ~4:3. The elements of a cause of action for unfair business 
6 
practices are: (1) a business practice; (2) that is unfair, 
7 
unlawful or fraudulent; and (3) authorized remedy. Bus. & Prof. 
8 
Code §17200; Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 
9 
10 
Cal.App.4th 659, 676; Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. 
11 
(2003) 30 Cal. 4th 303, 317 (damages cannot be recovered, but 
12 instead injunctive relief and restitution compelling defendant 
13 to return money); William L. Stern, Bus. & Prof. C. §17200 
14 Practice (The Rutter Group 2005) ~7:116 et seq.; 5 Witkin, 
15 California Pro. (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, §§735. See also 
16 Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 
17 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1362 (to be actionable unfair business 
18 practices, representations must be likely to deceive a 
19 
reasonable consumer, and not akin to puffing) . 
20 
"Proposition 64, which amended Business and Professions 
21 
Code section 17204 to provide that a private individual has 
2~ 
I~ standing to assert a claim under the UCL only if he or she 'has 
23 , 
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a 
,8 result of such unfair competition.'" 
2~ 
Buckland v. Threshold 
i0 Enterprises, Ltd. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 812. "Proposition 
,8 
i~ 
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1 64 amended the unfair competition law to provide that a private 
2 plaintiff may bring a representative action under this law only 
3 if the plaintiff has 'suffered injury in fact and has lost money 
4 
or property as a result of such unfair competition .... " Arias v. 
5 
Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 969, 978. Under the UCL, an 
6 
" 'inj ury in fact' [is a] ... 'distinct and palpable inj ury' suffered 
7 
'as a result of the defendant's actions.' Al ternati vely, ... another 
8 
definition of 'injury in fact' [is] as 'an invasion of a legally 
9 
10 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and 
11 
(b) 'actual or imminent, not conj ectural or hypothetical." 
12 Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 
13 1590. See also Hall v. Time Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 
14 854-55 ("[A] plaintiff suffers an injury in fact for purposes of 
15 standing under the UCL when he or she has: (1) expended money 
16 due to the defendant's acts of unfair competition; (2) lost 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
2,ZD 
\ i.J· 
23 
25 .•. 
money or property; or (3) been denied money to which he or she 
has a cognizable claim.") [citations omitted]. 
Similarly, Plaintiff must also allege that she has lost 
money or property as a result of such unfair competition. As 
stated recently by the Supreme Court: 
There are innumerable ways in which economic injury 
from unfair competition may be shown. A plaintiff may 
(1) surrender in a transaction more, or acquire in a 
transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have; 
(2) have a present or future property interest 
diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to 
which he or she has a cognizable claim; or (4) be 
-15-
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required to enter into a transaction, costing money or 
property, that would otherwise have been unnecessary. 
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 310, 323. 
"Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute." 
CCP §367. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in his own name. 
However, as established in Plaintiff's own opposition, the costs 
incurred in advertising with Defendant were incurred by 
Multiversal, LLC, which owns Rafters and Red Lantern, the two 
restaurants in question. Plaintiff attempts to argue that, 
because he is the sole owner of Multiversal, LLC, he has 
sufficient standing because he lost money because the LLC lost 
13 money. However, Plaintiff's argument essentially seeks to 
14 ignore the separate corporate identity of the LLC. ""A limited 
15 liability company is a hybrid business entity formed under the 
16 Corporations Code and consisting of at least two 'members' 
17 [citation] who own membership interests [citation]. The company 
18 has a legal existence separate from its members. Its form 
19 provides members with limited liability to the same extent 
20 
enjoyed by corporate shareholders [citation], but permits the 
21 
members to actively participate in the management and control of 
\ ~.l, the company [citation]." PacLink Communications Intern., Inc. 
23 
~''''~ 
v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 958, 963, citing 9 
2~!';' 
,." .... 
',1:" Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (2001 supp.) Corporations, §43A, p. 
25.". 
i~ 346. "[T]he principles of derivative lawsuits applicable to 
-16-
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1 corporations likewise apply to a limited liability company." 
2 PacLink Communications Intern., Inc., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 
3 963. See also California Corporations C. §17300. 
4 
"Ignoring a corporation's separate existence is a rare 
5 
occurrence, particularly where it is the shareholders who seek 
6 
to pierce its veil, and the courts will do so only 'to prevent a 
7 
grave injustice. [Citations.]'" Seretti v. Superior Nat. Ins. 
8 
Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 920, 931. "Individuals are free to 
9 
10 
operate their business in their own names and accept all its 
11 
debts and liabilities as their own. Having elected to avail 
12 themselves of the benefits of the corporate structure ... they 
13 cannot be heard to complain of their inability to take personal 
14 advantage of a right belonging to the corporation alone." Id. 
15 "[T]he individual shareholder may not bring an action for 
16 indirect personal losses (i.e., decrease in stock value) 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
sustained as a result of the overall harm to the entity." Bader 
v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775, 788. This prohibition 
also extends to claims for damages resulting from lost corporate 
profits: 
Because corporate profits belong to the corporation, 
and riot to its shareholders individually, lost profits 
are an "'injury to the corporation, or to the whole 
body of its stock'" (Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 
[(1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 106]) and therefore are 
derivative in nature. When corporate lost profits are 
sought as damages, the gravamen of the complaint is 
injury to the corporation, not injury to an individual 
shareholder. 
-17-
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1 
Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 
2 
3 
212, 232. 
4 The injury allegedly suffered in this case - expending 
5 money to advertise on Yelp's website due to Defendant's false 
6 and misleading advertising - are injuries to the LLC, not to 
7 Plaintiff. "Because members of the LLC hold no direct ownership 
8 interest in the company's assets (Corp. Code, §17300), the 
9 members cannot be directly injured when the company is 
10 improperly deprived of those assets." PacLink Communications 
11 Intern., Inc., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 964. The injury is 
12 
therefore derivative in nature and was only to the LLC. As 
13 
such, Plaintiff has no standing as an individual because he has 
14 
suffered no separate and individual injury in fact or lost 
15 
money. Therefore, his claims fail. 
16 
Second, the claims fail because the allegations do not 
17 
18 
include misrepresentations of fact. To be actionable unfair 
19 business practices, representations must be likely to deceive a 
20 reasonable consumer, and not akin to puffing. Consumer 
21 Advocates, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at 1362. As discussed above, 
2~: the alleged misrepresentations are puffery and opinions about 
23 the filter and its results and not representations of fact. 
",~ 
2a~ They are "boasts, all-but-meaningless superlatives," and 
,'~ 
; ,.:.~ 
25, "claim[s] which no reasonable consumer would take as anything 
-18-
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1 more weighty than an advertising slogan." Id. at 1361. As 
2 such, the statements cannot be actionable because the statements 
3 
were not likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. 
4 
Therefore, for the above reasons, Plaintiff failed to show 
5 
that he has a probability of prevailing on the merits. 
6 
III. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
8 
Based upon the foregoing, the court orders that: 
9 
10 
1) Defendant's Special Motions to Strike are GRANTED. 
11 
2) Defendant's Demurrers are OFF CALENDAR. 
12 MOVING PARTY TO GIVE NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES. 
13 NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ANY ORDER HEREIN SHALL EXPOSE THE NON-
14 COMPLIANT PARTY AND/OR COUNSEL TO ANY SANCTIONS AUTHORIZED BY 
15 LAW. 
16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
17 DATED: January 24, 2013 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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